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I. INTRODUCTION
A review of Texas and federal court cases over the past year shows
few significant changes to the voluminous and well-established
jurisprudence related to confessions, searches, and seizures.
Federal and state appellate courts give deference to trial court fact-find-




An individual's privilege against self-incrimination is protected by the
Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.1 Courts routinely
apply judicially and legislatively-created rules to guard against the admis-
sion of confessions obtained in violation of this privilege.
An individual's statement that is "freely and voluntarily made without
compulsion or persuasion" is admissible as evidence against that individ-
* Michael E. Keasler is a Judge on the Court of Criminal Appeals in Austin, Texas.
1. Herrera v. State, 241 S.W.3d 520, 525 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
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ual.2 A confession is voluntary if, under the totality of the circumstances,
"'the statement is the product of the accused's 'free and rational'
choice."' 3 A statement is involuntary if, in making the statement, "the
defendant's will was 'overborne' by police coercion."'4 In determining
whether a statement is voluntary, courts do not consider the truth or fal-
sity of the statement.5
When examining the totality of the circumstances to determine
whether a statement was made voluntarily, Texas courts consider the
following:
(1) relevant facts about the interrogation itself, such as the physical
location of the interrogation, the length of the detention, and the
number of people present; (2) the extent to which the accused was
denied access to outside resources, such as family, friends, or a law-
yer; (3) whether the accused was denied essential physical needs,
such as food, drink, or access to a bathroom; (4) the physical comfort
or discomfort of the accused; (5) the mental and physical condition
of the accused; and (6) the nature and extent of any promises or
threats made to the accused.6
In Delao v. State, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that the
totality of the circumstances standard "is also the appropriate standard to
apply when a confession is made by someone suffering from mental retar-
dation and mental illness."'7 In Calderon v. State, the San Antonio Court
of Appeals examined whether the appellant's mental impairment ren-
dered his confession involuntary. 8 At the suppression hearing, the appel-
lant presented, and the trial judge admitted, evidence that he was
learning disabled and suffered from major depression.9 The court of ap-
peals determined that "evidence of mental impairment is a factor to be
considered . . . in determining from the totality of the circumstances
whether the confession is voluntary." 10 An inquiry into the accused's
mental impairment is needed to determine "whether the accused's mental
impairment is so severe that he is incapable of understanding the mean-
ing and effect of his confession."11 Evaluating the appellant's evidence,
the court concluded that it failed to establish that the appellant "was inca-
2. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.21 (Vernon 2005); Herrera, 241 S.W.3d at
525.
3. Horn v. Quarterman, 508 F.3d 306, 323 (5th Cir. 2007) (quoting United States v.
Rogers, 906 F.2d 189, 190 (5th Cir. 1990)).
4. Rodriguez v. State, 248 S.W.3d 764, 768 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2008, no pet.)
(quoting Creager v. State, 952 S.W.2d 852, 856 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)).
5. Harty v. State, 229 S.W.3d 849, 854 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2007, pet. filed).
6. Moseley v. State, 223 S.W.3d 593, 597 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2007), affd, 252
S.W.3d 398 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008).
7. 235 S.W.3d 235, 241 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1228 (2008).
8. No. 04-05-00657-CR, 2006 Tex. App. LEXIS 9135, at *3-8 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio Oct. 26, 2006, no pet.).
9. Id. at *6.
10. Id. at *5.
11. Id.
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pable of understanding the meaning and effect of his confession. ' 12 In
support of its conclusion, the court observed that the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals has repeatedly "upheld the voluntariness of confes-
sions given by defendants with mental deficiencies more severe than
those of [the appellant]. 13
Texas courts have consistently recognized that "[t]rickery or deception
does not make a statement involuntary unless the method was calculated
to produce an untruthful confession or was offensive to due process.'
14
In Harty v. State, the Texarkana Court of Appeals was called upon to
determine whether the appellant's admissions to violating the terms of his
community supervision made during a mandatory polygraph examination
were involuntary due to the State's false representation that the state-
ments would be disclosed only to the appellant's therapist. 15 Setting out
the applicable law, the court explained, "Texas law prohibits the use of
any confession given by a defendant under the influence of an improper
promise."1 6 The court then considered the four requirements of an im-
proper promise, as defined by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals: "The
promise must be: 1) of some benefit to the defendant, 2) positive, 3)
made or sanctioned by a person in authority, and 4) of such character as
would be likely to influence the defendant to speak untruthfully."1 7 Eval-
uating the fourth requirement, the court held that the State's promise did
not influence the appellant to speak untruthfully because the appellant
had nothing to gain by making false statements; the false statements
would have adversely affected his treatment with his therapist and, if dis-
closed to authorities, would have been against his interest.'
8
"When the voluntariness of a statement is challenged, the Due Process
Clause requires the trial court to make an independent determination in
the absence of the jury as to whether the statement was voluntarily
made."' 9 This hearing is commonly referred to as a Jackson-Denno hear-
ing,20 and the burden falls on the prosecution to prove by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that a defendant's confession was voluntarily made
and is admissible. 2 '
Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, article 38.22, section 6, provides "a
two-step procedure for determining the voluntariness of a statement."
22
12. Id. at *7.
13. Id.
14. Harty v. State, 229 S.W.3d 849, 852 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2007, pet. filed).
15. Id. at 851-52, 855.
16. Id. at 856.
17. Id. (quoting Sossamon v. State, 816 S.W.2d 340, 345 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991)); see
also Horn v. Quarterman, 508 F.3d 306, 323 (5th Cir. 2007).
18. Id. at 856-57.
19. Id. at 852 (citing Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 380 (1964)).
20. Johnson v. State, No. 01-06-00621-CR, 2007 Tex. App. LEXIS 5497, at *6 (Tex.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] July 12, 2007, pet. ref'd).
21. Simpson v. State, 227 S.W.3d 855, 858 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, no
pet.).




"First, the trial court must, in the absence of the jury, make an indepen-
dent finding as to whether the statement was made voluntarily. ' 23 Sec-
ond, "[i]f the trial court finds that the statement was made voluntarily,
evidence pertaining to its voluntariness may be submitted to the jury, and
the court must instruct the jury that it may not consider the confession
unless it believes, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the confession was
voluntarily made."'24
In Vasquez v. State, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals clarified the
test for determining when an instruction on voluntariness under article
38.22 is required.25 A jury instruction on voluntariness is not required in
every case. 26 "[T]here is no error in refusing to include a jury instruction
where there is no evidence before the jury to raise the issue."'27 However,
because a trial judge's preliminary voluntariness finding does not prevent
the defendant from offering evidence of voluntariness at trial, a jury in-
struction on voluntariness is required when "the defense introduces evi-
dence at trial from which a reasonable jury could find that the confession
was not voluntarily made .... "28 A defendant is entitled to a voluntari-
ness instruction even though the defendant does not introduce new evi-
dence on the issue at trial and there is no factual dispute about the
evidence. 29
B. CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION
The United States Supreme Court decided, in Miranda v. Arizona, that
an individual subjected to custodial interrogation must be admonished of
certain warnings.30 Texas codified these "Miranda warnings" under arti-
cle 38.22, section 2(a) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. 31 Before
custodial interrogation, an accused must be told that:
(1) he has the right to remain silent and not make any statement at
all and that any statement he makes may be used against him at his
trial;
(2) any statement he makes may be used as evidence against him in
court;
(3) he has the right to have a lawyer present to advise him prior to
and during any questioning;
(4) if he is unable to employ a lawyer, he has the right to have a
lawyer appointed to advise him prior to and during any questioning;
and
(5) he has the right to terminate the interview at any time; .... 32
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. 225 S.W.3d 541, 545 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 546; Smith, 236 S.W.3d at 296.
29. Vasquez, 225 S.W.3d at 544-45.
30. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-68 (1966).
31. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.22 § 2(a) (Vernon 2005).
32. Id.
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Although the warnings in section 2(a), article 38.22 "are virtually identi-
cal to the Miranda warnings," Miranda requires only the first four warn-
ings. 33 The Miranda and article 38.22, section 2(a) warnings were
designed "to protect an accused from the combined compulsions inherent
in law enforcement custody coupled with law enforcement
interrogation." 34
Custodial interrogation is defined as "questioning initiated by law en-
forcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or other-
wise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way."'35 The
burden of proof to show that a confession was the result of custodial in-
terrogation lies with the defendant. 36
Interrogation has been defined as "words, actions, or questioning by
the police that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an
incriminating response from the accused."' 37 "This definition of 'interro-
gation' focuses 'primarily upon the perceptions of the suspect, rather than
the intent of the police." 38
For purposes of Miranda and article 38.22, "'[a] person is in 'custody'
only if, under the circumstances, a reasonable person would believe that
his freedom of movement was restrained to the degree associated with a
formal arrest."' 39 A "custody" determination involves a two-step in-
quiry: "'[F]irst, what were the circumstances surrounding the interroga-
tion; and second, given those circumstances, would a reasonable person
have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and
leave.'"40
Texas courts recognize four situations that may constitute custody:
(1) when the suspect is physically deprived of his freedom of action
in any significant way, (2) when a law enforcement officer tells the
suspect that he cannot leave, (3) when law enforcement officers cre-
ate a situation that would lead a reasonable person to believe that his
freedom of movement has been significantly restricted, and (4) when
there is probable cause to arrest and law enforcement officers do not
tell the suspect that he is free to leave.
41
The first three situations require more than an investigative detention;
rather, a restriction of movement to the degree generally associated with
33. Herrera v. State, 241 S.W.3d 520, 526 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
34. Russell v. State, 215 S.W.3d 531, 535 (Tex. App.-Waco 2007, pet. ref'd).
35. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.
36. Herrera, 241 S.W.3d at 526 (quoting Wilkerson v. State, 173 S.W.3d 521, 532 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2005)).
37. Pierce v. State, 234 S.W.3d 265, 272 (Tex. App.-Waco 2007, pet. ref'd) (citing
Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-01 (1980)); see also Moran v. State, 213 S.W.3d
917, 922-23 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
38. Moran, 213 S.W.3d at 923.
39. Herrera, 241 S.W.3d at 525 (quoting Dowthitt v. State, 931 S.W.2d 244, 254 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1996)).
40. Id. at 532 (quoting Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112 (1995)).
41. Resendez v. State, 256 S.W.3d 315, 325-56 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2007,
no pet.) (citing Dowthitt, 931 S.W.2d at 254).
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a formal arrest is needed. 42 Furthermore, custody is not automatically es-
tablished in the fourth situation.43 An officer's "knowledge of probable
cause" must be "manifested to the suspect," and "the manifestation of
probable cause, combined with other circumstances, [must] lead a reason-
able person to believe that he is under restraint to the degree associated
with an arrest."'44
The Houston Court of Appeals for the Fourteenth District addressed
this fourth situation in Resendez v. State.45 There, the appellant, during a
videotaped interview with police, admitted that he shot the victim after
failing a polygraph test.46 The appellant agreed to take the polygraph test
and to talk with police after completing the test.47 The appellant was not
given Miranda warnings before the interrogation and was arrested shortly
after the interrogation. 48 The court of appeals held that the appellant was
"in custody" for purposes of Miranda after he confessed to shooting the
victim and that the trial judge therefore erred in refusing to suppress the
appellant's statements following the admission.49 Even though the of-
ficers did not inform the appellant of their probable cause for his arrest,
the court of appeals inferred that the appellant was aware that there was
probable cause based on the facts known to him before the interrogation
as well as those learned during the interrogation.50 The court determined
that "a reasonable person in appellant's position [would] believe that he
was under restraint to the degree associated with an arrest" after admit-
ting to shooting the victim.5 1
When an accused invokes the Fifth Amendment right to counsel, the
accused may not be interrogated "until counsel has been made available
to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, ex-
changes, or conversations with the police. '5 2 When examining whether a
suspect invoked the right to counsel, courts examine "the totality of the
circumstances surrounding the interrogation" and "the alleged invoca-
tion. '53 A suspect's request for counsel must be clearly stated; "a reason-
able police officer" must be able to understand that the accused is
requesting an attorney.5 4 When a suspect makes an ambiguous request
for counsel, police may continue questioning the suspect and are not re-
quired to clarify the suspect's request.55 In Dalton v. State, the Austin
42. Id. (citing Dowthitt, 931 S.W.2d at 254).
43. Id. at 326.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 326.
46. Id. at 320.
47. Id. at 326.
48. Id. at 320, 326.
49. Id. at 327.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Cross v. State, 144 S.W.3d 524, 526 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (quoting Edwards v.
Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1983)).
53. Dalton v. State, 248 S.W.3d 866, 872-73 (Tex. App.-Austin 2008, pet. filed).
54. State v. Gobert, 244 S.W.3d 861, 864 (Tex. App.-Austin 2008, pet. granted).
55. Id.
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Court of Appeals held that the appellant's request to the arresting officer
to ask his friends to get him a lawyer was ambiguous because it only in-
formed the officer that the appellant might want an attorney at some
point. 56
Interrogation must also cease if an accused expresses the right to re-
main silent "at any time prior to or during questioning. '57 "The invoca-
tion of the right need not be formal; anything said or done by the accused
that could reasonably be interpreted as a desire to invoke the right is
sufficient to cut off questioning. '58 When a suspect unambiguously as-
serts the right to remain silent during questioning, police must cease all
interrogation of the accused.59 But when the assertion of the right to
remain silent is ambiguous, police officers do not have to stop the interro-
gation or clarify whether the accused invoked this right "before continu-
ing the interrogation. '60
In Smith v. State, the Houston First District Court of Appeals held that
the appellant failed to unambiguously invoke his right to silence when he
told the interrogating officer that he wanted to stop so he could get some-
thing to eat.61 The court held that the interrogating officer did not violate
the appellant's rights by continuing to question the appellant; "[t]he state-
ments indicate only that appellant was hungry and wanted to eat, not that
he wanted to end the interrogation.
'62
In Ramos v. State, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that the
appellant's statements to an interrogating officer that he "didn't want to
talk" and "[t]hat he didn't want to talk about it anymore" were an "un-
ambiguous, unequivocal, and unqualified assertion of [the appellant's]
right to remain silent."'63 The court also concluded that the officers did
not "scrupulously honor" the appellant's invocation when they continued
to interrogate the appellant five minutes after the appellant made these
statements. 64 The fact that one of the officers mirandized the appellant
for a second time shortly after re-initiating the interrogation did not "ne-
gate" the appellant's invocation of his right to remain silent.
65
C. STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS
Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, article 38.22, governs the admis-
sibility of oral and written confessions made during custodial interro-
56. Dalton, 248 S.W.3d at 873.
57. Smith v. State, 236 S.W.3d 282, 290 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, pet.
ref'd).
58. Id.
59. Simpson v. State, 227 S.W.3d 855, 858 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, no
pet.).
60. Smith, 236 S.W.3d at 290.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Ramos v. State, 245 S.W.3d 410, 413, 418-19 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008).
64. Id. at 419.
65. Id. (citing United States v. Taylor, 164 F.3d 150, 155 (3d Cir. 1998)).
20081
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gation.66 With regard to oral confessions, article 38.22, section 3(a)
provides:
No oral or sign language statement of an accused made as a result of
custodial interrogation shall be admissible against the accused in a
criminal proceeding unless:
(1) an electronic recording, which may include motion picture, video
tape, or other visual recording, is made of the statement;
(2) prior to the statement but during the recording the accused is
given the warning in Subsection (a) of Section 2 above and the ac-
cused knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waives any rights set
out in the warning;
(3) the recording device was capable of making an accurate record-
ing, the operator was competent, and the recording is accurate and
has not been altered;
(4) all voices on the recording are identified; and
(5) not later than the 20th day before the date of the proceeding, the
attorney representing the defendant is provided with a true, com-
plete, and accurate copy of all recordings of the defendant made
under this article.67
While the above requirements are obligatory, article 38.22, section 3(c),
explicitly excludes "any statement that contains assertions of facts or cir-
cumstances that are found to be true and which conduce to establish the
guilt of the accused, such as the finding of secreted or stolen property or
the instrument with which he states the offense was committed. '68
Additionally, section 5 of article 38.22 provides exceptions for:
* a statement made by the accused in open court at his trial, before
a grand jury, or at an examining trial in compliance with articles
16.03 and 16.04 of this code;
* statement that is the res gestae of the arrest or of the offense;
* a statement that does not stem from custodial interrogation;
* a voluntary statement, whether or not the result of custodial in-
terrogation, that has a bearing upon the credibility of the accused
as a witness; or
" any other statement that may be admissible under law.69
In Herrera v. State, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals considered
whether the defendant "was 'in custody' within the meaning of Miranda"
and article 38.22. 70 The appellant argued that his oral statement was
inadmissible because it was made when he was questioned by a law en-
forcement officer about an unrelated offense while he was inmate in the
county jail.71 The appellant claimed that Miranda warnings must be
given "when a person incarcerated on one offense is questioned by law
66. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.22 (Vernon 2005); see also Herrera v. State,
241 S.W.3d 520, 526 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
67. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. Art. 38.22 § 3(a) (Vernon 2005).
68. § 3(c).
69. §5.
70. 241 S.W.3d at 526-27.
71. Id. at 527.
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enforcement officials about a separate offense." 72
The court evaluated the appellant's claim in light of the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Mathis v. United States, 73 ultimately conclud-
ing that, "[a]lthough Mathis holds that Miranda warnings may be re-
quired when an inmate is questioned by law enforcement officials, Mathis
does not hold that Miranda warnings must precede all inmate interroga-
tions. ''74 The court further held that "incarceration does not always con-
stitute 'custody' for Miranda purposes when an inmate is questioned by
law enforcement officials 'regarding an offense separate and distinct from
the offense for which he was incarcerated."' 7 5 Because the court did not
"equate incarceration with 'custody' for purposes of Miranda," the court
considered whether the appellant was "in custody" under its "traditional
'custody' analytical framework. '76 The court provided a non-exhaustive
list of factors for the bench and bar to consider in this context:
* the language used to summon the inmate;
* the physical surroundings of the interrogation;
* the extent to which the inmate is confronted with evidence of his
or her guilt;
• the additional pressure exerted to detain the inmate or the
change in the surroundings of the inmate which results in an ad-
ded imposition on the inmate's freedom of movement; and
" the inmate's freedom to leave the scene and the purpose, place,
and length of the questioning. 77
Considering these factors, the court held that the appellant "failed to
meet his initial burden of establishing that he was 'in custody"' because
the trial record did not contain "any facts relating to the factors relevant
to determining 'custody[.]"' 78 The court therefore held that the exclusion
of appellant's oral statement was in violation of the Fifth Amendment
and article 38.22.79
D. JUVENILES
The Texas Family Code defines a child as a person:
* ten years of age or older and under seventeen years of age; or
" seventeen years of age or older and under eighteen years of age
who is alleged or found to have engaged in delinquent conduct or
conduct indicating a need for supervision as a result of acts com-
mitted before becoming seventeen years of age. 80
A child's statement is admissible if the statement does not "stem" from
72. Id.
73. Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1968).
74. Herrera, 241 S.W.3d at 531.
75. Id. (quoting United States v. Menzer, 29 F.3d 1223, 1231(7th Cir. 1994)).
76. Id. at 532.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 533.
80. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 51.02(2) (Vernon Supp. 2008).
2008]
SMU LAW REVIEW
custodial interrogation. 81 Further, a statement made by a child during
custodial interrogation is admissible "in any future proceeding concern-
ing the matter about which the statement was given if" the statement was
obtained in compliance with procedures set forth in section 51.095 of the
Texas Family Code. 82 Under section 51.095, a child suspect must receive
the same warnings as an adult suspect under article 38.22, section 2(a),
Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, except section 51.095(a)(1) provides
that the warnings must be given by a magistrate outside the presence of
the police or prosecutor.8 3 The magistrate is required to certify that the
child was examined outside the presence of law enforcement and that the
"child understands the nature and contents of the statement" and has
"knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived" his or her rights. 84
To determine whether a child's confession is voluntary, courts consider
the totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation. 85 Under
this standard, the child's "age, experience, education, background, and
intelligence" are taken into account when evaluating whether the child
has the ability to understand the warnings. 86
A statement obtained as a result of custodial interrogation without any
participation by a magistrate does not necessarily render a child's state-
ment inadmissible. In Vega v. State, the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals
considered the admissibility of a statement made by Vega, a juvenile,
without any participation by a magistrate.87 Vega fled to Chicago, Illi-
nois, after she was implicated in a capital murder in Texas.88 She was
apprehended in Illinois and interviewed about the murder by Chicago
police.89 At trial, the judge denied Vega's request to suppress the state-
ment.90 On appeal, Vega argued that her statement was inadmissible be-
cause a magistrate did not participate in obtaining her statement. 91
At the direction of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals on remand,
the court of appeals stated that it would
analyze the effect of the absence of a magistrate on the admissibility
of the challenged statement in a context of fairness to the parties,
focusing on the purpose expressed in section 51.01 of the family
code, which is 'to provide a simple judicial procedure through which
the provisions of this title are executed and enforced and in which
the parties are assured a fair hearing and their constitutional and
other legal rights recognized and enforced.' 92
81. § 51.095(b).
82. § 51.095.
83. § 51.095(a)(1), (b)(1).
84. § 51.095(a)(1)(B)(ii)(c).
85. Delao v. State, 235 S.W.3d 235, 239 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (citing Fare v. Michael
C., 422 U.S. 707, 725 (1979)).
86. Id. (quoting Michael C., 422 U.S. at 725).
87. 255 S.W.3d 87, 94 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2007, pet. ref'd).
88. Id. at 87.
89. Id. at 87-88.
90. Id. at 88.
91. Id. at 99.
92. Id. at 105.
[Vol. 61
Confessions, Searches, and Seizures
After reviewing the totality of the circumstances, the court held that
Vega's statement was admissible notwithstanding the lack of participation
by a magistrate.93 The court reasoned, "[t]he procedures utilized were
sufficient to carry out the underlying purpose of the Texas requirements;"
"Vega's constitutional and other legal rights were recognized and en-
forced, and she was assured a fair hearing as directed by section 51.01 of
the family code."'9
4
III. SEARCH AND SEIZURE
A. IN GENERAL
The United States and Texas Constitutions guarantee individuals pro-
tection form unreasonable searches and seizures. 95 The Fourth Amend-
ment to the United States Constitution specifically provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
96
Texas courts generally follow United States Supreme Court precedent
interpreting the Fourth Amendment when addressing search and seizure
issues under article 1, section 9, of the Texas Constitution.
The Fourth Amendment affords protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures to individuals with standing. Constitutional protec-
tions are invoked and standing is established only when an unreasonable
search or seizure is conducted by a government entity97 and when an indi-
vidual shows "that he or she personally has an expectation of privacy in
the place searched and that the expectation is reasonable. '98 The Fifth
Circuit addressed the privacy inquiry for standing in United States v. Fin-
ley.99 The court explained that whether an individual has a reasonable
expectation of privacy depends on: "(1) whether the defendant is able to
establish an actual, subjective expectation of privacy with respect to the
place being searched or items being seized, and (2) whether that expecta-
tion of privacy is one which society would recognize as reasonable."1 0 0
Courts also consider the following factors in evaluating an assertion of
privacy:
(1) whether the alleged aggrieved person has a property or posses-
sory interest in the thing seized or the place searched; (2) whether he
93. Id. at 119.
94. Id. at 115.
95. State v. Cullen, 227 S.W.3d 278, 281 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2007, pet. ref'd).
96. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
97. Bessey v. State, 199 S.W.3d 546, 550 (Tex. App.-Texarkana), affd, 239 S.W.3d
809 (Tex. Crim. App. Nov. 14, 2007).
98. Hollis v. State, 219 S.W.3d 446, 457 (Tex. App.-Austin 2007, no pet.).
99. 477 F.3d 250, 258 (5th Cir. 2007).
100. Id. (quoting United States v. Cardoza-Hinojosa, 140 F.3d 610, 614 (5th Cir. 1998)).
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was legitimately on the premises; (3) whether he had complete do-
minion or control and the right to exclude others; (4) whether, prior
to the search, he took normal precautions customarily taken by those
seeking privacy; (5) whether the property was put to some private
use; and (6) whether the claim of privacy is consistent with historical
notions of privacy. 1° 1
A frequently litigated issue is whether an individual has standing as an
overnight guest. In United States v. Taylor, the appellant, Taylor, claimed
he had standing under the Fourth Amendment because he was an over-
night guest at his girlfriend's home.' 0 2 Taylor relied on the Supreme
Court's decision in Minnesota v. Olson, which "held that a houseguest has
a legitimate expectation of privacy in his host's home, sufficient to 'enable
him to be free in that place from unreasonable searches and seizures.'"103
The Fifth Circuit explained that under Olson, an individual's "rights as a
guest are limited to those that he could assert with respect to his own
residence.' 0 4 The court held that Taylor, as a houseguest, "was entitled
to the same Fourth Amendment protections in his girlfriend's apartment
that he would have received in his own home.' 0 5
In June 2007, the United States Supreme Court held that a passenger in
a car, along with the driver, has standing under the Fourth Amendment
to challenge the constitutionality of a traffic stop and an ensuing search
and seizure.' 0 6 In Brendlin v. California, the Court explained that
"[w]hen a police officer makes a traffic stop, the driver of the car is seized
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.' 0 7 The Court acknowl-
edged that, although it had not "squarely answered the question whether
a passenger is also seized" during a traffic stop, it had stated "over and
over in dicta that during a traffic stop an officer seizes everyone in the
vehicle, not just the driver."'1 8 As a result, the Court extended standing
to a passenger of a vehicle, thereby enabling a passenger to challenge the
constitutionality of a traffic stop.10 9
Although a probationer's home is subject to the Fourth Amendment's
reasonableness requirement, probationers have a diminished expectation
of privacy in the home by virtue of their status. In United States v. Le-
Blanc, the Fifth Circuit held that when a probation officer conducts a
home visit that is authorized under state law, the visit does not have to be
supported by a reasonable suspicion that the probationer is engaging in
criminal activity."10 The court also held that a probation officer's brief,
101. Hollis, 219 S.W.3d at 457; see also United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250, 258-59 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 2065 (2007).
102. 482 F.3d 315, 318 (5th Cir. 2007).
103. Taylor, 482 F.3d at 318 (quoting Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 98 (1990)).
104. Id.
105. Id. at 319.
106. Brendlin v. California, 127 S. Ct. 2400, 2403, 2410 (2007).
107. Id. at 2403.
108. Id. at 2406.
109. Id. at 2403.
110. 490 F.3d 361, 369 (5th Cir. 2007).
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"plain view search" of a probationer's home in the course of conducting
an authorized home visit does not require proof of reasonable
suspicion.'11
"[T]he Fourth Amendment does not require the exclusion of evidence
that is the product of a search or seizure conducted by a private party.
112
The Texas exclusionary rule, article 38.23(a) of the Texas Code of Crimi-
nal Procedure,11 3 "mirrors the federal one" but, "unlike the Fourth
Amendment, [it] applies to certain actions by private individuals as well
as those by government officers. 1 1
4
In a recent case, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals addressed the
issue of private party seizures when a tow-truck driver arrested an indi-
vidual for DWI.115 In Miles v. State, the appellant filed a motion to sup-
press under the Texas exclusionary rule, claiming that the evidence
obtained during the tow-truck driver's arrest should have been sup-
pressed.1 16 After an extensive explanation of the history of the Texas
exclusionary rule, the court stated:
If the police cannot search or seize, then neither can the private citi-
zen. Conversely, if an officer may search or seize someone under the
particular circumstances, then the private citizen's equivalent con-
duct does not independently invoke the Texas exclusionary rule, and
the evidence obtained by either the officer or the private person may
be admissible.1 17
The court held that under the circumstances, the tow-truck driver was
authorized to make a citizen's arrest because he had probable cause to
believe that the appellant was driving while intoxicated and he effectu-
ated the arrest in a manner that a reasonable police officer could have
legally done." 18
B. ARREST, STOP OR INQUIRY WITHOUT WARRANTS
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has recognized three distinct cat-
egories of police-citizen interaction, each of which requires a different
level of constitutional protection: (1) encounters, which do not require
justification by an officer;119 (2) investigative detentions, which require
reasonable suspicion;120 and (3) arrests, which must be supported by
111. Id. at 368-70.
112. Bessey v. State, 199 S.W.3d 546, 550 (Tex. App.-Texarkana), affd, 239 S.W.3d
809 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
113. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.23(a) (Vernon 2005).
114. Miles v. State, 241 S.W.3d 28, 32 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
115. Id. at 29.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 36.
118. Id. at 45-56.
119. Baldwin v. State, 237 S.W.3d 808, 811 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet.
granted) (citing State v. Perez, 85 S.W.3d 817, 819 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002)).






"Encounters are consensual interactions between citizens and police;"
thus, they are distinct from investigative detentions and arrests because
they "do not implicate constitutional rights. 122 A typical encounter in-
volves a police officer approaching an individual "in a public place to ask
questions, request identification, or request consent to search as long as
the interaction is consensual-that is, as long as an officer does not con-
vey a message that compliance with the officer's request is required."'1 23
2. Investigative Detentions (Terry Stops)
An investigative detention, commonly referred to as a "Terry Stop,"
"occurs when an individual is confronted by a police officer, yields to the
officer's display of authority, and is temporarily detained for purposes of
an investigation. 1 24 Investigative detentions and arrests are considered
seizures for constitutional purposes.12 5 But an investigative detention al-
lows law enforcement officers to "stop and briefly detain persons sus-
pected of criminal activity on less information than is constitutionally
required for probable cause to arrest. 1 26 Thus, an investigative detention
represents a middle ground between an arrest and a consensual
encounter.
In Terry v. Ohio, the United States Supreme Court established the fol-
lowing two-part test for determining whether an investigative detention is
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment: (1) "whether the officer's ac-
tion was justified at its inception," and (2) "whether it was reasonably
related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in
the first place. 1 27
Under the first prong of a Terry analysis, an investigative detention is
justified if, under "the totality of the circumstances," an officer has rea-
sonable suspicion to detain an individual. 12 8 Reasonable suspicion, justi-
fying a police officer's stop, "exists if the officer has specific, articulable
facts that, when combined with rational inferences from those facts,
would lead him to reasonably conclude that a particular person actually
is, has been, or soon will be engaged in criminal activity.' 2 9 Reasonable
suspicion must be based on "more than an 'inchoate and unparticularized
121. Garcia v. State, 218 S.W.3d 756, 759 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.)
(citing State v. Ballard, 987 S.W.2d 889, 892 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999)).
122. Franks v. State, 241 S.W.3d 135, 141 (Tex. App.-Austin 2007, pet. ref'd).
123. Id. (citing Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434-35 (1991)).
124. Id.
125. Bartlett v. State, 249 S.W.3d 658, 668 (Tex. App.-Austin 2008, no pet. h.).
126. Arthur v. State, 216 S.W.3d 50, 55 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2007, pet. filed).
127. 392 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1968).
128. Tanner v. State, 228 S.W.3d 852, 855 (Tex. App.-Austin 2007, no pet.).
129. Castro v. State, 227 S.W.3d 737, 741 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); see also Tanner, 228
S.W.3d at 855.
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suspicion or hunch' of criminal activity. '130 The officer's subjective intent
is not a factor in determining reasonable suspicion, and "[t]he State has
the burden to show that the officer had an objective basis for [making]
the stop. 1 3
1
The second requirement of a Terry analysis commands that "[t]he
scope of the detention must be carefully tailored to its underlying justifi-
cation. ' 132 The scope of each detention will vary based on the unique
facts and circumstances of each case.1 33 "An investigative detention must
be temporary, and the questioning must last no longer than is necessary
to effectuate the purpose of the stop."'1 3 4 Additionally, an officer's inves-
tigative methods "should be the least intrusive means reasonably availa-
ble to verify or dispel the officer's suspicions within a short period of
time." 135
The boundary between an investigative detention and an arrest is often
blurry. An investigative detention may transform into an all-out arrest if
an officer's use of force exceeds what is reasonably necessary to achieve
the goal of the stop. 13 6 But how does one distinguish between these two
types of seizures? The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals explained in
Mount v. State, that, "whether a detention is an actual arrest or an investi-
gative detention depends on the reasonableness of the intrusion under all
of the facts.' 37 In determining reasonableness, courts have considered
such factors as: "the nature of the crime under investigation, the degree
of suspicion, the location of the stop, the time of day, and the reaction of
the suspect."' 38 Further, an individual is found to be under arrest "when
he or she has been actually placed under restraint or taken into
custody."'1 39
In Baldwin v. State, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals addressed an en-
counter that developed into an investigative detention and, ultimately, an
arrest.' 40 In that case, a police officer patrolling a neighborhood was
"flagged down by a middle-aged female" resident who informed him that
she had just seen a suspicious-looking white male dressed in black peer-
ing into the windows of several homes. 141 Both the officer and the wo-
man were aware that "there had been a string of recent burglaries in the
130. Lambeth v. State, 221 S.W.3d 831, 837 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2007, pet ref'd)
(quoting Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000)).
131. Tanner, 228 S.W.3d at 855.
132. Arthur v. State, 216 S.W.3d 50, 55 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2007, no pet.).
133. Id.
134. Lambeth, 221 S.W.3d at 836; see also Hart v. State, 235 S.W.3d 858, 861 (Tex.
App.-Eastland 2007, pet. dism'd).
135. Arthur, 216 S.W.3d at 55.
136. Mount v. State, 217 S.W.3d 716, 724-25 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, no
pet.).
137. Id. at 724.
138. Id. at 725.
139. Washburn v. State, 235 S.W.3d 346, 350 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2007, no pet.).
140. 237 S.W.3d 808, 810-12 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet. granted).
141. Id. at 810.
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neighborhood. 1 42 Investigating the woman's report, the officer discov-
ered the appellant walking on the sidewalk. When the appellant saw the
officer's patrol car, he began to walk "at a very fast pace. 11 43 The officer
caught up with the appellant, exited the car, and asked the appellant for
his identification. The appellant, who appeared nervous and refused to
make eye contact with the officer, questioned the officer's request and
told the officer that he had no right to stop him. Because, at that point,
the officer "believed [the] appellant was about to flee or fight," the of-
ficer handcuffed the appellant.144 The officer then removed the appel-
lant's wallet from the appellant's pocket so he could identify the
appellant. When he removed the appellant's license, he discovered a
"small baggy containing a white powder[.]"'145 The officer then arrested
the appellant.1 46
On appeal, the appellant claimed that the trial judge erred in overrul-
ing his motion to suppress because the detention was not supported by
reasonable suspicion or probable cause. 147 The court of appeals rejected
the appellant's claim. The court of appeals explained that the officer did
not need probable cause or reasonable suspicion to talk to the appellant
because he was in a public place. 148 Considering the detention, the court
held that it was supported by reasonable suspicion:
Appellant's nervousness, shuddering, evasiveness, refusal to identify
himself to a police officer, and manner of wearing all black clothing
at 10:30 p.m. in a neighborhood where there had been a recent string
of burglaries, coupled with the woman's report that she had seen ap-
pellant looking into houses, are indicative of criminal activity.1 49
The court further held that the officer's "momentary intrusion ... into
appellant's pants pocket to retrieve his identification was a minimal, nec-
essary, and reasonable encroachment upon appellant's liberty under the
circumstances presented here. '150
Courts regularly engage in a Terry analysis in the context of routine
traffic stops, which "resemble[ ] an investigative detention.' 51 Fre-
quently at issue is the scope of the detention. 152 During a traffic stop, an
officer is allowed to request the following information from the driver:
(1) "information concerning the driver's license," (2) "ownership of the
vehicle," (3) "the driver's insurance information," (4) "the driver's desti-
142. Id.






149. Id. at 812.
150. Id. at 814.
151. Lambeth v. State, 221 S.W.3d 831, 836 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2007, pet. ref'd).
152. Hart v. State, 235 S.W.3d 858, 861-62 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2007, pet. dism'd); see
also Lambeth, 221 S.W.3d at 831.
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nation," and (5) "the purpose of the trip. ' 153 However, an officer can
prolong the driver's detention beyond "the purpose of the initial stop" to
issue a citation or if the officer has "reasonable suspicion to believe that
another offense has been or is being committed. '154
In St. George v. State, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals extended
the application of Terry to passengers of a vehicle. 155 The court held that
"[a]lthough Terry did not specifically consider passengers in a vehicle sub-
jected to an investigative detention, the test outlined in Terry is suffi-
ciently comprehensive to address this issue as well."' 156 There, the
appellant was a passenger in a car that was stopped by two sheriff's depu-
ties for having a broken license plate light.157 After issuing the driver a
citation, the deputies asked for appellant's name and birth date several
times, repeatedly telling him this had "to be resolved before he could
leave. '158 The court held that when the citation was issued to the driver,
"the deputies did not have specific articulable facts to believe that Appel-
lant was involved in criminal activity, thus, the questioning of Appellant
regarding his identity . ..without separate reasonable suspicion, went
beyond the scope of the stop and unreasonably prolonged its
duration."159
3. Warrantless Searches and Arrests
Under the United States Constitution, warrantless searches and
seizures are "presumptively unreasonable.' 60 While "the warrant re-
quirement is not lightly set aside, '1 61 the Fourth Amendment tolerates
some specific, well-established exceptions, 62 which include: "exigent cir-
cumstances, '163 the "automobile exception,"'1 64 searches incident to ar-
rest,1 65 consent,1 66 protective sweeps, 167 frisks,' 68 items in plain view, 169
and the community-caretaking function.' 70
A defendant who claims a Fourth Amendment violation bears the bur-
153. Lambeth, 221 S.W.3d at 836.
154. Id.
155. 237 S.W.3d 720 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
156. Id. at 726.
157. Id. at 721-22.
158. Id. at 726.
159. Id.
160. Gutierrez v. State, 221 S.W.3d 680, 685 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 685.
164. Curry v. State, 228 S.W.3d 292, 295 (Tex. App.-Waco 2007, pet. ref'd).
165. Vasquez v. State, No. 05-06-00486-CR, 2007 Tex. App. LEXIS 2737 (Tex. App.-
Dallas Apr. 10, 2007, pet. ref'd).
166. Johnson v. State, 226 S.W.3d 439, 443 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
167. Id. at 442.
168. Martinez v. State, 236 S.W.3d 361, 370 (Tex. App. -Fort Worth 2007, pet. dism'd).
169. Keehn v. State, 245 S.W.3d 614, 615 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2007, pet. granted)
170. Franks v. State, 241 S.W.3d 135, 143 (Tex. App.-Austin 2007, pet. ref'd).
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den of proving "that a search or seizure occurred without a warrant."'1 7 1
But "the State shoulders the burden to prove that an exception to the
warrant requirement applies. 1 72
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has identified three categories of
exigent circumstances where a warrant is not required: "(1) providing aid
or assistance to persons whom law enforcement reasonably believes are
in need of assistance; (2) protecting police officers from persons whom
they reasonably believe to be present, armed, and dangerous; and (3)
preventing the destruction of evidence or contraband.1 73
In Gutierrez v. State, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that law
enforcement officials were not justified under the exigent circumstances
exception to conduct "a full-blown search of the appellant's home.' 74
After receiving a report that a stolen computer was located at the appel-
lant's home, Corpus Christi police officers went to the appellant's
house. 175 The appellant, who saw the officers arrive, met the officers on
his porch after he extinguished a marijuana cigarette and closed the front
door. When questioned about the computer, the appellant admitted that
he had it inside his house. One of the officers detected the smell of mari-
juana and noticed that the appellant's eyes were bloodshot and that he
was "very nervous.' 76 The officers entered the appellant's house after
the appellant gave his consent. When retrieving the computer, the of-
ficers smelled marijuana and saw a burnt marijuana cigarette in plain
view. 177 They conducted "a cursory visual search and found cash, a police
scanner, and several plastic baggies."' 78 The officers then called narcotics
officers to assist them. When the narcotics officers arrived, they "con-
ducted a thorough warrantless search" of the house and discovered "co-
caine, cash, a pistol and ammunition, digital scales, and other drug
paraphernalia." 179
Addressing the appellant's claim that the search violated his Fourth
Amendment rights, the court stated that "[t]o validate a warrantless
search based on exigent circumstances, the State must satisfy a two-step
process.' 80 First, "probable cause to enter or search a specific location"
must be present.1 8 "Second, an exigency that requires an immediate en-
try to a particular place without a warrant must exist. 18 2 Examining the
case before it, the court held that while probable cause likely existed,
171. Amador v. State, 221 S.W.3d 666, 672 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (quoting Russell v.
State, 717 S.W.2d 7, 9 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986)).
172. Gutierrez v. State, 221 S.W.3d 680, 685 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
173. Id.
174. Id. at 686.
175. Id. at 683.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 684.
178. Id.
179. Id.
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"the exigency of the situation called for a measured police response to
maintain the status quo. ' 183 The court then concluded that the situation
did not justify a full-blown search of the appellant's home by the narcot-
ics officers. 184
"It is well settled that 'in the case of a lawful custodial arrest a full
search of the person is not only an exception to the warrant requirement
of the Fourth Amendment, but is also a 'reasonable' search under that
Amendment.' ",185 "Evidence seized incident to arrest is admissible if suf-
ficient probable cause existed to justify the arrest. 18 6
The Eastland Court of Appeals considered whether the Texas Constitu-
tion provides greater protection to searches conducted incident to an ar-
rest in State v. Oages.187 The court of appeals explained that Texas courts
have recognized the rule expressed by the United States Supreme Court
in New York v. Belton,188 discussing the scope of the "search incident to
arrest" exception. 189 In Belton, the Supreme Court held that "when a
policeman has made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an auto-
mobile, he may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the
passenger compartment of that automobile." 190 The Oages court con-
cluded, "[W]here there is a search incident to the arrest of an occupant of
a vehicle, Texas follows the bright-line rule of Belton in interpreting
[a]rticle I, section 9 of the Texas Constitution ...."191
The Fifth Circuit addressed the scope of the "search incident to arrest"
exception in United States v. Finley.192 In that case, law enforcement offi-
cials seized the appellant's cell phone from his pocket after he was ar-
rested. 193 On appeal, the appellant challenged the search of the cell
phone's call records and text messages because it was conducted without
a warrant.194 Recognizing that law enforcement officers may "look for
evidence of the arrestee's crime on his person in order to preserve it for
use at trial,"'195 the court held that the search was lawful because it was a
search conducted incident to the appellant's arrest.196
A warrantless search of an automobile is justified because "vehicles are
inherently mobile and the expectation of privacy with respect to an auto-
183. Id. at 686.
184. Id.
185. United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250, 259 (5th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct.
2065 (2007) (quoting United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973)).
186. Vasquez v. State, No. 05-06-00486-CR, 2007 Tex. App. LEXIS 2737, *11-12 (Tex.
App.-Dallas Apr. 10, 2007, pet. ref'd).
187. 227 S.W.3d 397 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2007, pet. ref'd).
188. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981).
189. Oages, 227 S.W.3d at 400.
190. Belton, 453 U.S. at 460.
191. Oages, 227 S.W.3d at 400.
192. 477 F.3d 250 (5th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 2065 (2007).
193. Id. at 254.
194. Id. at 258.
195. Id. at 259-60 (citing United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 233-34 (1973)).
196. Id. at 260.
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mobile is relatively low."1 97 Therefore, the automobile exception allows
a law enforcement official to "conduct a warrantless search of a motor
vehicle if the officer has probable cause to believe the vehicle contains
evidence of a crime." 198 "Probable cause 'exist[s] where the known facts
and circumstances are sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable prudence
in the belief that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found[.]"' 199
"Known facts and circumstances include those personally known to the
officer or those derived from a 'reasonably trustworthy' source. '200
In United States v. Meredith, the Fifth Circuit considered a case involv-
ing a stop and frisk of a passenger. 20 1 In Meredith, the appellant was a
passenger in a car that was stopped by officers for operating without tail
lights.202 The driver and appellant were ordered to step out of the car,
but the appellant stated that he could not comply with the request be-
cause he was a paraplegic. One of the officers frisked the driver while the
other opened the passenger-side door and "observed a bulge shaped like
a handgun in the left rear side of [the appellant's] pants. °20 3 The officer
reached inside the car, frisked the appellant, and removed a loaded hand-
gun. Concluding that the frisk was reasonable, the trial judge found that
the officer had reasonable suspicion to believe that the appellant was
armed and was therefore a threat to his safety. 20 4
The court upheld the trial judge's ruling. Extending United States Su-
preme Court precedent that allows law enforcement officers to order a
vehicle's occupants to step out during a lawful traffic stop, the court con-
cluded that the officer was permitted, without reasonable suspicion, to
open the car door and conduct a visual inspection of the appellant, a
physically disabled occupant.20 5 The court also determined that the frisk
was lawful; once the officer saw the bulge in the appellant's pocket, he
had reasonable suspicion to believe the appellant was armed and
dangerous.20 6
The seizure of an individual by a police officer is reasonable under the
community-caretaking function even though the officer does not have
reasonable suspicion or probable cause to believe the individual commit-
ted a crime.207 The community-caretaking function was discussed in
Franks v. State208 and Gibson v. State.20 9 In Franks, the Austin Court of
197. Curry v. State, 228 S.W.3d 292, 295 (Tex. App.-Waco 2007, pet. ref'd).
198. McNickles v. State, 230 S.W.3d 816, 819 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, no
pet.).
199. Wiede v. State, 214 S.W.3d 17, 24 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (quoting Torres v. State,
182 S.W.3d 899, 901-03 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005)).
200. McNickles, 230 S.W.3d at 819 (quoting Wiede, 214 S.W.3d at 24).
201. 480 F.3d 366, 367-71 (5th Cir. 2007).
202. Id. at 367.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 368.
205. Id. at 369.
206. Id. at 371.
207. Gibson v. State, 253 S.W.3d 709, 714 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2007, pet. ref'd).
208. 241 S.W.3d 135 (Tex. App.-Austin 2007, pet. ref'd).
209. 253 S.W.3d 709.
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Appeals explained that the following dual inquiry is required to deter-
mine whether the community-caretaking exception is applicable: "[F]irst,
whether the police officer was primarily motivated by a community-care-
taking purpose; and second, whether the officer's belief that the individ-
ual needed help was reasonable. '210
The Amarillo Court of Appeals addressed the second inquiry in Gib-
son. There, a police officer stopped the appellant's car after receiving a
report from a woman that her daughter, a juvenile, left a high school
football game with the appellant. 211 The woman told the officer that she
was concerned about her daughter because the appellant was in his thir-
ties.212 The officer stopped the appellant's car based on the description
of the car provided by the girl's mother.213 After learning that the appel-
lant did not have a valid driver's license, the officer arrested the appel-
lant.2 14 The officer then conducted a search of the vehicle and discovered
marijuana. At trial, the appellant moved to suppress the marijuana, argu-
ing that it was discovered pursuant to an unlawful search and seizure.
The trial judge denied the appellant's motion.215
The appellant challenged the trial judge's refusal to grant the motion
on appeal. 216 Consulting the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals's opinion
in Wright v. State,217 the court set out four factors that should be consid-
ered when determining whether the officer's belief that his assistance was
needed was reasonable:
(1) the nature and level of the distress exhibited by the individual;
(2) the location of the individual; (3) whether the individual was
alone and/or had access to assistance other than that offered by the
officer; and (4) to what extent the individual, if not assisted,
presented a danger to himself or others.2 18
The Gibson court evaluated the evidence in light of these factors and
held that "the stop was not shown to have been a valid exercise of the
community caretaking function. '219 In reaching this holding, the court
concluded that the stop was not justified because (1) the nature and level
of distress exhibited by the woman's daughter, as relayed to the officer by
her mother, was not elevated enough; (2) the stop occurred near the
daughter's house; (3) the officer "could not identify any of the individuals
in appellant's car nor could he identify the number of individuals in the
vehicle;" and (4) there was no evidence of how the woman's daughter
"was placed in danger by getting a ride home from appellant," and the
210. Franks, 241 S.W.3d at 144.
211. Gibson, 253 S.W.3d at 712.
212. Id. at 713.
213. Id. at 712.
214. Id. at 713.
215. Id. at 714.
216. Id. at 717.
217. 7 S.W.3d 148, 151-52 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999).
218. Gibson, 253 S.W.3d at 714-15.
219. Id. at 723.
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appellant was not driving in a manner that indicated that he was a danger
to himself or others.220
In addition to the well-established exceptions to the search warrant re-
quirement discussed above, "[c]hapter 14 of the Texas Code of Criminal
Procedure defines the statutory exceptions permitting warrantless ar-
rests. '221 "If the accused makes a statutory argument, the proper inquiry
is (1) whether there was probable cause with respect to that individual
and (2) whether the arrest fell within one of the statutory exceptions [to
the warrant requirement]." 222 The State has the burden "to prove the
existence of probable cause to justify a warrantless arrest. '223
In Garcia v. State, the Houston Court of Appeals for the First District
discussed the interaction between two statutory exceptions that allow a
police officer to make a warrantless arrest. In that case, a Houston Sher-
iff's Deputy stopped the appellant because the appellant's vehicle did not
have a front license plate in violation of section 502.404 of the Texas
Transportation Code. 224 When the deputy also discovered that the appel-
lant did not have a valid driver's license in violation of section 521.025 of
the Transportation Code, the deputy ordered the appellant to get out of
the vehicle and placed him under arrest.22 5 The appellant filed a motion
to suppress at trial, arguing that the arrest was illegal. The trial judge
denied the motion.226
The court of appeals affirmed. 227 The court held that the arrest was
authorized under article 14.01(b) of the Texas Code of Criminal Proce-
dure, which "allows a peace officer to arrest 'an offender without a war-
rant for any offense committed in his presence or within his view,'" and
section 543.001 of the Texas Transportation Code, which "allows any
peace officer to arrest without a warrant a person found committing a
traffic violation, except for speeding or a violation of the open container
law. "228
C. ARREST OR SEARCH WITH WARRANTS
In Texas, the requirements for issuing a search warrant are governed by
article 18.01 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. On the other
hand, the requirements for arrest warrants are governed by chapter 15 of
the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. Although search and arrest war-
rants are governed by different statutes, "[t]he same standards apply to
any challenge to the adequacy of an affidavit presented for issuance of an
220. Id. at 722-23.
221. State v. Cullen, 227 S.W.3d 278, 283 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2007, pet. ref'd).
222. Id. (quoting State v. Steelman, 93 S.W.3d 102, 106 n.5 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002)).
223. State v. Nelson, 228 S.W.3d 899, 906 (Tex. App.-Austin 2007, no pet.).
224. 218 S.W.3d 756, 759 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 2007, no pet.); see TEX.
TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 502.404 (Vernon Supp. 2008).
225. Garcia, 218 S.W.3d at 759; see TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 521.025 (Vernon Supp.
2008).
226. Id.
227. Id. at 760.
228. Id.; see TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 543.001 (Vernon 1999).
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arrest or search warrant. '229
The Texas and United States Constitutions demand that search and ar-
rest warrants be issued only upon probable cause. 230 "Probable cause to
support the issuance of a search warrant exists when the facts submitted
to the magistrate are sufficient to justify a conclusion that the object of
the search is probably on the premises at the time the warrant is is-
sued. ' '231 Gurrusqueita v. State2 32 and Glaze v. State233 discuss the requi-
sites for an arrest warrant affidavit, also known as a "complaint" under
the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure.234 Similar to a search warrant
affidavit, the complaint "must provide the magistrate with sufficient in-
formation to support an independent judgment that probable cause exists
to believe that the accused has committed a crime. '235 An appellate court
may consider only the four corners of a search or arrest affidavit when
determining whether sufficient probable cause existed to issue the war-
rant.236 But a magistrate's finding of probable cause is given great defer-
ence so as "to encourage police officers to use the warrant process rather
than making a warrantless search and later attempting to justify their ac-
tions by invoking some exception to the warrant requirement. '237
In Harris v. State, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals addressed the
consequences of having a false statement in a warrant affidavit. The
court, following the United States Supreme Court's decision in Franks v.
Delaware,238 explained that "a defendant who makes a substantial pre-
liminary showing that a false statement was made in a warrant affidavit
knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, may
be entitled by the Fourth Amendment to a hearing, upon the defendant's
request. '239 To be entitled to a Franks hearing, the defendant must:
(1) Allege deliberate falsehood or reckless disregard for the truth by
the affiant, specifically pointing out the portion of the affidavit
claimed to be false; (2) Accompany these allegations with an offer of
proof stating the supporting reasons; and (3) Show that when the
portion of the affidavit alleged to be false is excised from the affida-
vit, the remaining content is insufficient to support issuance of the
warrant.240
The court also explained that if the defendant establishes, by a prepon-
derance of the evidence, perjury, recklessness, or reckless disregard, the
229. Glaze v. State, 230 S.W.3d 258, 259 (Tex. App.-Waco 2007, pet. ref'd).
230. Rodriguez v. State, 232 S.W.3d 55, 60 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); Glaze, 230 S.W.3d at
260.
231. Brown v. State, 243 S.W.3d 141, 145 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2007, pet. ref'd).
232. 244 S.W.3d 450, 452 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2007, pet. ref'd).
233. 230 S.W.3d at 259.
234. Id. at 260.
235. Gurrusqueita, 244 S.W.3d at 452; Glaze, 230 S.W.3d at 260.
236. Brown, 243 S.W.3d at 145; Glaze, 230 S.W.3d at 260.
237. Rodriguez v. State, 232 S.W.3d 55, 59-60 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
238. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155-56 (1978).




false material in the affidavit is discarded.241 But if "the remaining con-
tent of the affidavit does not then still establish sufficient probable cause,
the search warrant must be voided .... "242
In L.A. County v. Rettele, the United States Supreme Court considered
whether the detention of the respondents while law enforcement officials
executed a valid search warrant was unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment. 243 There, Los Angeles County Sheriff's Deputies obtained
a valid search warrant for a home believed to house several suspects in-
volved in a fraud and identity-theft crime ring.244 The deputies executed
the warrant and entered the respondent's home, but unbeknownst to the
deputies, the suspects had moved out three months earlier.245 The depu-
ties ordered the respondents, who were unclothed and asleep in their bed,
to get up and show their hands.246 The respondents attempted to get
dressed but were quickly instructed not to move. 247 The respondents
sued the sheriff's department, claiming, among other things, that their
Fourth Amendment right "to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures" was violated when Los Angeles County Sheriff's Deputies
searched their home.248
The Court held that the search, including the detention of the respon-
dents, was reasonable. 249 The Court reasoned that, "[w]hen officers exe-
cute a valid warrant and act in a reasonable manner to protect themselves
from harm .. ., the Fourth Amendment is not violated. '250
In Martinez v. State, the appellant challenged the execution of a valid
search warrant, claiming that police officers conducted an unlawful
search and seizure by failing "to knock and announce before executing
their narcotics search warrant."'2 5' The Austin Court of Appeals con-
cluded that the exclusionary rule did not apply in light of the United
States Supreme Court's decision in Hudson v. Michigan.252 The court of
appeals explained that "[t]he 'knock-and-announce' rule is a prerequisite
for forcible entry" and "does not apply if officers gain entry to a house
without using force, even if entry is accomplished by a ruse. ' 253 The
court explained that in the appellant's case, force was not used to gain
entry into his hotel room because the police officers "used a ruse. '25 4
In United States v. Bruno, the Fifth Circuit held that, in light of Hudson
v. Michigan, suppression is not the remedy for a violation of the federal
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. 127 S. Ct. 1989, 1992-94 (2007) (per curiam).
244. Id. at 1990-91.
245. Id. at 1991.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 1990.
249. Id. at 1992-94.
250. Id. at 1993-94.
251. 220 S.W.3d 183, 186-87 (Tex. App.-Austin 2007, no pet.).
252. Id. at 188-89; see also Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006).
253. 229 S.W.3d at 189.
254. Id.
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statutory knock-and-announce requirement under title 18, United States
Code, § 3109.255
D. CONSENT
An individual's voluntary consent to a search is also one of the well-
established exceptions under the Fourth Amendment warrant require-
ment.256 The State bears the burden to show that consent was "volunta-
rily given, and not the result of duress or coercion, express or implied. '2 57
While the United States Constitution "'only requires the State to prove
the voluntariness of consent by a preponderance of the evidence,"' the
Texas Constitution provides greater protection by requiring "the State to
show by clear and convincing evidence that the consent was freely
given. ' 258 Furthermore, courts consider the totality of the circumstances
to determine whether consent was voluntarily given by an individual.2 59
The objective standard applies in examining the scope of consent; thus,
the relevant inquiry is: What would the ordinary reasonable person have
understood under the same circumstances? 260
In Beall v. State, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals stated that courts
consider certain factors in determining whether consent was voluntarily
given, including: (1) "whether the consenting person was in custody," (2)
"whether he was arrested at gunpoint," (3) "whether he had the option of
refusing consent," (4) "the constitutional advice given to the accused,"
(5) "the length of detention," (6) "the repetitiveness of the questioning,
and" (7) "the use of physical punishment."'261
BeaU v. State also discussed the issue of consent given by a third
party.262 The appellant was in the shower when the co-occupant of his
hotel room allowed police officers to search the room.2 63 The appellant
argued that "he could neither consent nor object to the entry, and any
evidence seized must be suppressed. ' 264 The court rejected the appel-
lant's claim, explaining that the appellant's reliance on Georgia v. Ran-
dolph265 was improper because his case was not one in which a "cotenant
gives consent and the other cotenant is present and objects. '266 The
court held that the appellant was "on the wrong side of the 'fine line'
drawn by the Supreme Court in Randolph; as a potential objector, nearby
255. 487 F.3d 304, 306 (5th Cir. 2007) (interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 3109 (1993)).
256. Johnson v. State, 226 S.W.3d 439, 443 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
257. Beall v. State, 237 S.W.3d 841, 848 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2007, no pet.) (quoting
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248 (1973)).
258. Washburn v. State, 235 S.W.3d 346, 353 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2007, no pet.)
(quoting Carmouche v. State, 10 S.W.3d 323, 331 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000)).
259. Lambeth v. State, 221 S.W.3d 831, 838 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2007, pet. ref'd).
260. Johnson, 226 S.W.3d at 443.
261. BeaU, 237 S.W.3d at 848.
262. Id. at 847.
263. Id. at 845.
264. Id. at 846-847.
265. Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103 (2006).
266. Beall, 237 S.W.3d at 847.
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but not invited to take part in the colloquy between [the co-occupant]
and the police. '267
"The taking of a blood specimen is considered a search and seizure
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 2 68 But, as the Texarkana
Court of Appeals explained in Washburn v. State, an individual who
drives while intoxicated is found to have impliedly consented to the tak-
ing of a blood specimen. 269 In doing so, the court observed that Texas
Transportation Code, section 724.011, "provides that a person who has
been arrested for an offense arising out of acts committed while the per-
son was operating a motor vehicle in a public place while intoxicated is
deemed to have consented to the taking of one or more specimens of
breath or blood for analysis. '270 But, the court stated that an individual
has "an absolute right to refuse a test[,]" and "[c]onsent may be involun-
tary if induced by an officer's misstatement of the consequences of
refusal.2 71
In Neesley v. State, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals clarified the
meaning of "specimen" in section 724.012(b) of the Transportation Code,
which mandates that a police officer take a breath or blood specimen
when a person was killed or suffered serious bodily injury as a result of a
car accident. 272 Although section 724.012(b) plainly states that a police
officer is required to take no more than one specimen, the legislative in-
tent suggests that a police officer may take more than one, when neces-
sary, because "specimen" means a "usable sample.
273
IV. CONCLUSION
Over the past year, Texas state and federal courts have considered vari-
ous aspects of the law related to confessions, searches, and seizures. Re-
cent decisions by these courts present few changes to the well-established
precedent in these areas.
267. Id. at 848.
268. Washburn v. State, 235 S.W.3d 346, 349 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2007, no pet).
269. Id. at 350.
270. Id. (citing TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 724.001 (Vernon 1999)).
271. Id.
272. 239 S.W.3d 780, 783-86 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (interpreting TEX. TRANSP. CODE
ANN. § 724.012(b) (Vernon 1999).
273. Id. at 785-86. The statute states that an officer "shall require the taking of a speci-
men ...... TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 724.012(b) (Vernon 1999) (emphasis added).
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